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Abstract— The Semantic Web (SW) is a significant advancement 
in the field of Internet technologies and an uncharted territory as 
far as security is concerned. In this paper we investigate and assess 
the impact of known attacks of SPARQL/SPARUL injections on 
Semantic Web applications developed in PHP. We highlight future 
challenges of developing robust Semantic Web applications using 
PHP. Our results demonstrate and quantify impacts on 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) breaches of data 
in Semantic Web applications. Our recommendations are targeted 
to PHP developers, to encourage them to integrate security as early 
in their design and coding practice as possible. 
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I.  Introduction  
Throughout the history of Internet technology, from Web 1.0 
to Web 2.0 and Web 3.0, significant security issues have arisen. 
As the Semantic Web (SW) is a recent innovation of the Internet 
world, and it imports different data from different applications 
and resources, the possibilities of security issues increase. 
Masses of people, companies, universities and governments use 
the Internet. Therefore, significant and sensitive data becomes 
target of cyber-attacks. 
Several studies have discussed the security of the SW in 
different layers. SPARQL, Blind SPARQL and SPARUL 
injections become known attacks in the SW world. In this paper 
we cover these types of attacks that challenge the security of SW 
applications.  
Only a limited number of approaches that have studied the 
SPARQL injection attacks [3][4][14] exist. They have all 
applied their tests using Java and placed RDF data and the 
ontology on the Jena framework server. Their work did not (1) 
use a PHP as development language, (2) use a Sesame as RDF 
data store and SPARQL engine, (3) demonstrate a risk 
assessment on the security framework, (4) list all possible 
solutions or provide any algorithm for mitigation and test the 
system after mitigation. The research presented in this paper 
considers all of these limitations. Other research efforts [1] [10] 
have just touched on the SPARQL vulnerabilities and possible 
solutions. 
On the other hand, several systems have started moving their 
data to be linked on the world of linked data, starting from 
building standard ontologies such as a health care system 
towards smart hospitals for smart cities [35]. With this paradigm 
shift, and in order to implement a secure SW system, ensuring 
which web application development languages are ready to be 
employed before being stuck in the middle, is critical. That is 
why in this work we attempt to use different languages and 
taking healthcare as an example. 
Our assumption is that there exists a vulnerability on the SW 
application that is developed by PHP which allow 
SPARQL/SPARUL injection attacks to break its security with a 
high risk on the local RDF/OWL and external data. To assess the 
SW system under such SPARQL injections attacks and the 
related risks, we implement a sample PHP SW application, apply 
risk analysis on the system to measure the risks and then try to 
mitigate and patch the vulnerability for defending purposes. 
We performed SPARQL/SPARUL injection attacks on the 
linked data in the boundary of a particular application and 
outside it. In addition, we found that there is no such tool in PHP 
to mitigate these attacks comparing with Java language. As a 
result, we provide a filter algorithm to prevent such attacks and 
provide recommendations for PHP developers toward secure 
SW application using PHP.  
This paper has been organised as follows. Section 2 
discusses related work, section 3 describes the implementation 
of a SW application taking healthcare as an example, section 4 
demonstrates relevant attacks by providing different goals for 
attacking the SW applications, section 5 presents performing the 
attacks against the example Healthcare SW System, section 6 
demonstrates the results of the experiment in addition to the 
analysis of the problem and the risk assessment, section 7 shows 
different possible solutions for preventing the attacks in addition 
to providing a filter algorithm to solve the problem and finally 
section 8 is evaluation. 
II. Related Works 
In the world of massive information, contribution, 
collaboration, education, business and trade marketing through 
the Internet, security has become a challenge that has to be 
studied in order to provide secure places for information storage 
and exchange.  It is always said "Security is not a subject and 
Security is a verb", and to achieve the goal of the security, three 
aspects should be studied: Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability known as CIA [11]. 
The most essential thing on the web is information. 
However, the purpose is not just to have big data for the sake of 
it, but to have better, trustful and secure data. As a result, any 
improvements in that domain should achieve a better outcome 
for users to feel empowered by it. When users collaborate, they 
want to keep their privacy and thus can trust when they share 
their sensitive information. The secrecy of this information 
depends on the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [11]. 
 However, the web and web applications are a target for 
cyber-attackers. In order, to achieve the goal of being secure in 
the SW era, security researchers have begun to study the security 
of SW technology from different aspects and in different layers 
[12][13][14][16][2][8][9].   
One of the most common breaches of security in web 1.0 and 
web 2.0 is SQL injections. Malicious SQL statements are 
injected into an entry field of a form on the website. SQL 
injection takes advantage of security weaknesses in the 
application’s software. The input by the user can get access to 
specific information or it can delete, corrupt or transfer the entire 
database [20]. 
In addition to the common attacks of SQL Injection, Light 
Weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Injection and XPath 
Injection, are new techniques that can compromise the new 
mechanisms [5]. Main ontology query language libraries do not 
provide any way to avoid the new code injections of a SPARQL 
Injection, Blind SPARQL Injection and SPARUL Injection [3]. 
Early work [3] has identified the SPARQL/SPARUL 
injection, and applied their attack on a SW application 
implemented in Java, and stored the data in Jena apache server. 
Researchers [4] have tested their prototype system under 
SPARQL injection, analyzing the attack. Additionally, recent 
work (in 2016) [14] has built an insecure SW application to be 
an environment to allow researchers, students, developers to 
understand the attack by applying it on their system. 
III. Healthcare Semantic Web System Implementation 
The healthcare SW System is an application that has been 
developed in order to implement attacks, taking an example 
healthcare system as a case-study because of the importance of 
the security and privacy of medical data. This development is 
described briefly in this section.  
A.  Why Healthcare 
Healthcare data is sensitive and must remain private and 
secure. Work in [11] has started to build a healthcare ontology 
toward a smart hospital for smart cities. Consequently, this work 
can give some recommendations for the healthcare system 
developers to consider in their applications. 
A Healthcare Semantic Web System (HCSWS) is a Semantic 
Web application that is partly developed with the intention to 
apply SPARQL injection attacks to examine their impact on a 
particular data server and a particular language. 
B. Requirements Analysis 
The implementation purpose is to investigate the SW 
vulnerabilities. The implementation captures doctors' 
information, patients' information and doctor reports. The data 
has been chosen randomly with regards to having some critical 
and sensitive information typical for healthcare systems to build 
a linked data.  
 Fig. 1 is illustrates the processes applicable for the HCSWS, 
and is just a small part of a complete healthcare system where 
typical actors are Doctors, Patients and Nurses. For brevity this 
work focuses on the Nurse because this is enough to carry out 
the intended experiment: 
The data flow diagram shows that there are three processes 
in the HCSWS: search for patients' names of a particular doctor, 
update a particular patient's name and delete a particular patient's 
record. Each one of these processes is divided into minor 
processes. Process 1.0 is divided as four minor processes: 
Receive the doctor name from the user, Send the name to the 
healthcare data store, Check whether the name exists and Return 
the results. Process 2.0 is made up of four minor processes: 
Receive the old and the new name from the user, Send the name 
of a patient, Check whether the name exists, Send the new name 
and Update (Replace) the old name with the new name. Process 
3.0 is divided into four minor processes: Receive the patient 
name from the user, Send the name of a patient, Check whether 
the name exists and Delete the triples of that patient. 
C.  HCSWS Design & Implementation 
The HCSWS designed and implemented using PHP 5.5.12 
running on the WAMP server, the data implemented using RDF 
turtle and stored in Sesame 2.8.6 store server. Fig. 2 represents 
the architecture of the HCSWS. For the RDF data query, 
SPARQL 1.1 used. EasyRDF library used for communicating 
PHP with SPARQL engine.  
IV. ATTACK EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
This section describes the design of the experiments of 
SPARQL injections attacks on the HCSWS. It also provides 
definitions and goals for each attack.  
We implemented different malicious codes to examine the 
system under these attacks. In addition, we target various 
healthcare data, as being valuable on the HCSWS in order to 
assess the risk of the attacks and to check their effect on the 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the HCSWS.  
Figure 1. The Data Flow Diagram of the Healthcare Semantic Web system 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of the HCSWS 
Let us consider the following scenario: the nurse exploits her 
authority for accessing some data to access something she is not 
supposed to have access to. In other words, the nurse will act as 
an attacker and more formally, the threat agent will be a 
malicious nurse. 
From the previous section, the intended goal of each process 
of the HCSWS is clear in addition to the results from each one. 
However, We can see how the malicious nurse can have another 
goal to achieve by injecting the user input with a malicious code. 
Definition 1: Injection attack is a threat on a vulnerable user 
input by adding malicious code after a required input. This code 
follows SPARQL Syntax to be combined with the actual query 
that asks for user input.   
A. SPARQL Injection 
The attacker in this injection targets the user input in the 
search screen in Fig. 3. As we have seen, the required input of 
the search input is a doctor name, and the target goal is to retrieve 
a list of that doctor's patients' names. Having said that, the nurse 
had another goal. Did she succeed?  
For the experimental design, the doctor name has been typed, 
followed by injection code, which is a SPARQL query. In this 
design, we have assumed that the attacker has guessed the 
correct variable for select SPARQL query. 
Definition 2: A SPARQL injection is an injection attack in 
which the attackers can guess the select variable to ask for 
whatever they want. 
First malicious goal: The nurse's target is to read a particular 
patient's medical reports instead of patient’s name. Technically, 
her target is to read one of the local RDF data items on the 
HCSWS that is not supposed to be accessible to her. 
Malicious code design: 
    
   Mark". 
   ?p foaf:firstName "Sarah". 
   ?m hc:reportFor ?p. 
   ?m hc:reportDescription ?name. }# 
INPUT 1:  MALICIOUS CODE 1 
Note: for readability, the code is separated from text on a gray 
background 
Second malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know all 
HCSWS data type. Formally, her target is to read all local 
ontologies on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design:
    
   Sam". 
   ?a ?name ?b. 
   }# 
INPUT  2:  MALICIOUS CODE 2 
Third malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know all names 
in dbpedia. In other words, her target is to read global RDF on 
the dbpedia, which has this URI < http://DBpedia.org/sparql>. 
Malicious code design:
    
  Sam". 
  SERVICE <http://DBpedia.org/sparql> 
  { 
  SELECT ?name 
  WHERE{ ?a foaf:name ?name.} LIMIT 50}}# 
INPUT  3: MALICIOUS CODE 3 
Note: Dbpedia is a SPARQL engine for querying sophisticated 
data from Wikipedia. The goal is to check the possibility of 
accessing remote data through the HCSWS. 
Fourth malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know all 
properties types that have been used in dbpedia. More formally, 
her target is reading global ontologies on the dbpedia. 
Malicious code design: 
    
  Sam". 
  SERVICE <http://DBpedia.org/sparql> 
  { 
  SELECT DISTINCT ?name 
  WHERE{ ?a ?name ?b.} LIMIT 50}}# 
INPUT 4: MALICIOUS CODE 4 
B. Blind SPARQL Injection 
Likewise, the target in this injection is the user input in the 
search screen “Fig. 4”. The nurse will have different goals to 
achieve, instead of the intended one. Indeed, it is similar to 
SPARQL injection, even on the design with a small difference. 
Assuming that the attacker is unaware of the select variable. In 
other words, she/he cannot guess the variable name that has been 
used in the actual query. 
As it has been done in the SPARQL injection, by inserting 
malicious code after the doctor name, the same can be done to 
perform Blind SPARQL injection. 
Definition 3: A Blind SPARQL injection is an injection attack 
in which the attackers cannot guess the SELECT variable. Even 
though, they are trying to track their malicious goal by the way 
of asking queries one by one to get a true or false answer. 
First malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know all patients' 
emails. More formally, her target is to read some unauthorised 
local RDF data on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design:
    
 
    Sam". 
    ?a hc:editedBy ?b. 
    ?a hc:reportFor ?c. 
    ?c foaf:firstName ?d. 
    ?d foaf:email ?n. 
    FILTER regex(?n,"^B*")}# 
INPUT 5:  MALICIOUS CODE 5 
Second malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know the 
reportDate data type. Stated differently, her target is a particular 
local ontology on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design: 
    
   Sam". 
   ?a ?n ?b. 
   FILTER regex(?n,"^H*")}# 
INPUT 6: MALICIOUS CODE 6 
Third malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know the 
occupation of the person whose name is Thomas in dbpedia. In 
other word, her target is one of the global RDF on the dbpedia, 
which has this URI < http://DBpedia.org/sparql>. 
Figure 3. Part of the Search Screen in the HCSWS 
Figure 5. Part of the Delete 
screen in the HCSWS 
Malicious code design:
    
  Sam". 
  SERVICE <http://DBpedia.org/sparql> 
  { 
   SELECT ?n 
   WHERE{  
     ?a foaf:name "Thomas B. Fitzpatrick". 
            ?a dbo:occupation ?n.  
     FILTER regex(?n,"^[a-g]*")}}}# 
INPUT 7: MALICIOUS CODE 7  
Fourth malicious goal: The nurse's target is to know the data 
type nationality to check if it is used or not. More formally, her 
target is to know one of the global ontologies on the dbpedia. 
Malicious code design: 
  
  Sam". 
  SERVICE <http://DBpedia.org/sparql> 
  { 
  SELECT ?n 
  WHERE{ ?a ?n ?b. 
    FILTER regex(?n,"^na*")     
  }}}# 
INPUT 8:  MALICIOUS CODE 8 
C.  SPARUL Injection 
The targeted screens in this attack are the update and delete 
screens as it presented in Fig. 4 and Fig.5. The nurse here, as 
before, had different malicious goals. 
Definition 4: A SPARUL injection is an injection attack that 
deals with the SPARQL update function to apply a malicious 
goal by a malicious user. This injection might use the delete or 
insert technique to corrupt the data.  
Firstly, looking at the update screen, the required inputs are 
the old name of a particular patient and the new name to be 
updated. The attack target input in here is the new name input.  
To apply the attack, the old name will be written, in addition 
to the new name followed by malicious code. The attacker does 
not have to know any SPARQL variable, which makes it easier. 
First malicious goal: The nurse's target is the new name input 
to add medical report for that patient. Technically, her target is 
adding data on the local RDF on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design:  
    
   Ethan"; 
   hc:medicalCondition hc:R7. 
   hc:R7 hc:reportDescription "Lorem ipsum dolor 
sit amet, cueir   mod contentiones nam, his 
no aliquam  
   WHERE { 
   ?a ?b ?c. 
   }# 
INPUT 9: MALICIOUS CODE 9 
Another formula without #
    
    Ethan"; 
    hc:medicalCondition hc:R7. 
    hc:R7 hc:reportDescription "Lorem ipsum 
dolor sit amet, cu eirmod contentiones nam 
,"; 
INPUT 10: MALICIOUS CODE 10 
Second malicious goal: The nurse's target is the new name input 
to add a mental health new field in the patients graph in order to 
add some data. In other words, her target is adding a new 
property to the ontology. 
Malicious code design:
    
   Ethan"; 
   hc:mentalHealth "Lorem ipsum dolor sit 
amet,cu eirmod contentiones nam,".} 
   WHERE { 
     ?a ?b ?c. 
   }#"; 
INPUT 11: MALICIOUS CODE 11 
Secondly, in the delete screen shown on Fig. 5, the required 
input in the delete screen is a particular patient name and the 
objectives is to delete all of this patient's records. Nevertheless, 
the malicious nurse had different goal to achieve.  
First malicious goal: In this scenario, the malicious nurse target 
is the patient name input to delete all data on the Healthcare 
system. A bit more formally, her target is deleting all subjects, 
predicates and objects on the local RDF on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design: 
    
    Gareath". 
    ?a ?b ?c.} 
    WHERE{ 
    ?a ?b ?c. 
    }# 
INPUT 12: MALICIOUS CODE 12 
Second malicious goal: The attacker target is the patient name 
input to delete all property fields. In other words, her target is to 
delete all the relations and predicates on the HCSWS. 
Malicious code design: 
    
    Gareath". 
    ?a ?c ?b.} 
    WHERE{ 
    ?a ?c ?b. 
    }# 
INPUT 13: MALICIOUS CODE 13 
 
V.  RUNNING THE EXPERIMENTS 
This section presents how to run the experimental attacks on 
the HCSWS. 
A. The HCSWS versus the Attack 
To run our attack experiment on the HCSWS, we will inject 
the designed malicious codes to the target input. 
The search input in the HCSWS was the SPARQL injection 
target and the Blind SPARQL injection target. Therefore, the 
search input has been injected by their designed malicious codes 
to be proceed by code1. For example, injecting input 1 to search 
input. 
Figure 4. Part of the update 
screen in the HCSWS 
    
<? 
1   $name= $_POST['name']; 
2   $query= " 
3     SELECT DISTINCT ?name 
4     WHERE {?s foaf:firstName \"" .  
5     $name . "\". ?r hc:editedBy ?s.              
      ?r hc:reportFor ?p.  
      ?p foaf:firstName ?name.} 
6     "; 
7   $result = $sparql->query($query); 
?> 
CODE 1: THE CODE OF THE SEARCH INPUT TREATMENT ON HCSWS 
Note: line 5 is split into two lines for display purposes. 
Furthermore, the new user input, which was the target for a 
SPARUL malicious user, had been injected by (input 9 and 11) 
where it was treated by the update code to perform the change 
as shown in code 2.  
    
<? 
1    $old_name= $_POST['old_name']; 
2    $new_name= $_POST['new_name']; 
3    $query= " 
4      DELETE { 
5        ?p foaf:firstName \"" . $old_name . 
"\". 
6      } 
7      INSERT { 
8        hc:P2 foaf:firstName \"" . $new_name . 
"\".} WHERE {?p        foaf:firstName 
\"Gareath\".} 
9      "; 
10    $result = $sparql->update($query); 
?> 
CODE 2: THE UPDATE TREATMENT ON THE HCSWS 
Ultimately, the target for some of the SPARUL injection 
attacks was the user input on the delete screen. It was injected 
by input 12 and 13. The input was posted to be processed by 
code 3 which is the code for processing delete function by PHP. 
    
<? 
1    $name= $_POST['name'];     
2    $query= " 
3      DELETE { 
4        ?p foaf:firstName " . $name . ".} 
WHERE{?p foaf:firstName \"Ethan\".} 
5    "; 
6    $result = $sparql->update($query); 
?> 
CODE 3: THE PHP CODE OF SPARQL DELETE TREATMENT ON HCSWS 
 
By testing the HCSWS under the injections attacks, our 
experiment was completed.  
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Through the experiments, it has been shown that the 
SPARQL/SPARUL injection attacks represent high risks. This 
section discuss the results of our injection attacks, with a critical 
analysis of these attacks in addition to a risk assessment. 
A. Experimental Results and Analysis 
After applying the attacks on the HCSWS, it was found that 
all malicious goals had succeeded, and the attacker achieved 
what they intended. The attacks targeted the local RDF, OWL 
and the external RDF, OWL. The following illustration of the 
results in “Table 1” demonstrates the impact on the local and 
external RDF data and ontologies. 
TABLE 1: THE RSULTS OF THE SPARQL/SPARUL INJECTION ON THE HCSWS 
AND ON THE EXTERNAL RDF AND OWL 
               Assets   
Injections     
Local 
RDF 
External 
RDF 
Local OWL External 
OWL 
SPARQL Read Read Read Read 
Blind SPARQL Read Read Read Read 
SPARUL Write | 
Delete 
____ Write | 
Delete 
____ 
These injections are threats on the CIA of the SW. We can 
infer that, with SPARQL and Blind SPARQL injection attacks, 
confidentiality of the data has been lost. Meanwhile, the 
authenticity and integrity of the local data has been 
compromised by the SPARUL injection in addition to data 
availability. That is, the security framework has been affected by 
these injections. Table 2 highlights the potential impact of these 
attacks on the CIA of the SW. 
Looking back at the designed SPARQL injection, it is 
noticeable that the SPARQL variable ?name had been used in 
the (code 1) for treating the search input and in the (input 1) in 
the injection design. This means that the attackers have to guess 
this variable to achieve their goal. Nevertheless, it is not so 
difficult to guess this variable since it might either be printed 
from the system as a property field's name or it can be a 
reasonable variable name. 
 
TABLE 2: THE RISK IMPACT ON CIA OF THE SEMANTIC WEB 
Security 
Objectives 
Risk Impact Example 
Confidentiality Unauthorized users can gain access to confidential 
and secret data. An example was given when the 
malicious nurse was able to access medical reports 
instead of patients' names. 
This was illustrated in input 1 and code 1 
Integrity The authenticity of the patient reports when the 
malicious nurse has added a report for a particular 
patient. Consequently, we cannot trust these 
reports. 
This was illustrated in input 9 and code 2 
Availability When everything on the system has been deleted, 
the data would not be available and the system 
would not work correctly. 
This was illustrated in input 12 and code 3 
The Blind SPARQL injection attacker had blindly tried to 
ask the query function recursively about their goals. The query 
function replied by nothing to be printed and there are no 
mistakes when it is right. Conversely, if the regular expression 
is not on the domain of what the attacker asked, the query 
function gives an error message. As a result, the attacker does 
not need to guess any variable. However, it can take some time 
to get the result. Although, the attacker can use some techniques 
to decrease the time by using letters range in the regular 
expression in the code. So instead of using ^B* in (input 5) for 
example, we can use ^[A-M]* which will decrease the time of 
asking. On the other hand, it might be not logical to use this 
injection to target the predicate since it is always a URI which is 
too long to use the blind way to know it. 
The SPARUL injection had used a different function to be 
achieved, which is the update function instead of the query 
function. Therefore, the attackers cannot exploit the query input 
for deleting or adding, they have to use the update input for this 
purpose. However, in our experiments, the malicious nurse used 
the update screen to add some malicious code to be performed 
by the update function.  
It was found that the easiest and most dangerous attack is the 
SPARUL injection if there is a chance of using the update 
function. The attackers does not need to guess any variable or 
test the query; they just have to follow the syntax of inserting or 
deleting. Moreover, it can be seen in (input 10) that the attack 
can be successful even without using a hash sign if it was in a 
particular format. 
Having said that, there are reasons to allow these attacks to 
occur. To understand what they are, we have analysed one of the 
SPARQL code example that has received the injection in order 
to find out the reasons for these attacks and try to find the 
weaknesses. 
By analysing the search processing code (Code 1) for the 
query function as it presented in Fig. 6, it was found that the 
structure of the SPARQL query is divided into SPARQL 
reserved words, SPARQL variables, relations from ontologies 
that are represented by URIs and SPARQL punctuation marks 
in addition to the PHP variable.  
From the analysis, the weak point is the PHP variable that is 
supposed to receive a user input from the user without checking 
what the input might be. Is it the required input or not? If it is not 
the required, what might it be?  
To understand the mechanism of the attack, let us look back 
at our experiment. For instance, when the malicious nurse used 
(input 1) to inject the search input on the HCSWS, the search 
input has sent the input content to (code 1). The PHP variable 
$name in (code 1) has been exchanged by the input content then 
it was combined with the code. After that, the SPARQL query 
function processed the code by SPARQL query syntax. As the 
attacker had ended their malicious input by hash sign, which is 
a comment command in SPARQL syntax, everything after the 
hash sign on the same line had been commented out. The final 
SPARQL query that was sent to the SPARQL engine on the 
Sesame server was the following: 
    
    SELECT DISTINCT ?name 
    WHERE {?s foaf:firstName "Sam". 
      ?p foaf:firstName "Ben". 
      ?m hc:reportFor ?p. 
      ?m hc:reportDescription ?name. } 
OUTPUT 1: THE SPARQL CODE AFTER QUERY FUNCTION 
 
Consequently, the malicious goal has been achieved instead 
of the HCSWS target goal and the attacker had changed the path 
of the RDF graph.  
It was found that the attacks succeeded when they meet the 
following conditions: 
From the developer's side (HCSWS): 
- The user input was not validated. 
- The code was in a particular format, which accept the attack 
(in one line). 
From the attacker's side (attack experiment design): 
- The attacker followed the required input by a SPARQL 
code. 
- The attacker attached a hash sign to the end of the code to 
comment out all of the following on the actual code. 
B. Risk Assessment 
The most valuable content in the HCSWS is the data that has 
to be protected, so the asset is the local RDF data and the local 
OWL in addition to the external one. Stating differently, in the 
real world, we have to protect the money from being stolen. 
Likewise, the most important thing in the linked data world is 
the data itself, we have to protect the information especially the 
sensitive one. 
After analysing the code, it can be understood that the threat 
on the HCSWS is when the threat agents can take advantage of 
writing whatever they want on the user input without validation. 
As a result, the threat agent on the HCSWS was the malicious 
nurse and the threat is the malicious code. The user input is a 
system vulnerability in this situation. Risk analysis is presented 
in  Fig. 7.  
From the attacks that were successful, we notice that the 
malicious code has enforced the SPARQL code to have a 
different path on the HCSWS graph instead of the correct one. 
Meanwhile, to escape the target goal by commenting it out and 
targeting another one. The attacker can either change the path or 
start another path on the graph. SPARQL is an easy language to 
query the RDF data. Having the start point, you can continue to 
the end, crawling from the start node by using subject, predicate 
and object until the goal is reached. All data properties and types 
are from standard ontologies. Thus, everything is accessible.  
Figure 7. The Risk analysis of the SPARQL/SPARUL injection on the 
HCSWS 
Figure 6. Analyzing the content of SPARQL code inside PHP 
For example, in the experiment the attacker has decided to 
start a new path. Taking input 1 that has injected the code 1 for 
example, the target goal was all patients' names for a particular 
doctor. However, the attacker decided to have description record 
for the patient Sarah instead. Therefore, she has started with the 
information that she had, that the patient name is Sarah, asking 
for her medical report and then her reports description. Hence, 
she jumped from the main graph to start from another one by 
specifying the start point, which was the patient Sarah, instead 
of continuing after the name of the doctor by using semicolon as 
the SPARQL syntax demonstrated in Fig.8. 
As a result, the extension of the attack might reach remote 
data in addition to local data. The attacker can target any RDF 
graph just by using subject, predicate and object way. This 
ability to access any local or external data makes us aware of the 
powerfulness of the SPARQL injections abilities and this ability 
from the powerfulness of the SPARQL query language. Still, the 
injection can be prevented with some effort. More on the risk 
mitigation in the following section. 
 
 
VII. COUNTERMEASURES AND RISK MITIGATION 
We have shown that SPARQL/SPARUL injection attacks 
can have significant impact on the HCSWS, as it was 
unprotected from these injections. This applies to any SW 
application that has the same vulnerability. In this section, 
different types of safeguards have been tested in the HCSWS. 
These countermeasures are always recommended to prevent any 
injection attacks similar to SQL injection. Our recommendations 
are to: use ParametrizedString, define permissions and assign 
access control for each user and filter and validate the user input. 
A. ParametrizedString Tool 
In previous studies [6], the prepared statements have been 
successfully used to prevent SQL injection. Following studies 
[13][1] have recommended to use the same techniques by 
providing ParametrizedString to protect the system from the 
various SPARQL injection types. As a consequence, Jena API 
[7] has provided this tool for the Java developers to mitigate the 
vulnerability of SPARQL/SPARUL injections attacks. On the 
other hand, there is no such tool to be used in PHP. Therefore, 
we could not attempt to apply this countermeasure. 
B. Permission and Access Control 
Assigning permission and access control for the system user 
is one of the suggested solutions for preventing attacks. 
However, in our experiment on the HCSWS, the authorized user 
who is the nurse, is the one who decided to exploit this 
permission to add malicious code. Even though, it is important 
to assign privileges for each user on the system, not all 
authorized users are trustful. Therefore, the mitigation should 
not depend on the users; but rather, it should have a powerful 
security by itself. There are no reasons to leave the vulnerability 
without mitigation by specifying the permissions since this will 
not satisfy the security. 
C. Filtering User Input 
In the previous section, the query code in the HCSWS that 
processed the user input has been analyzed to understand the 
reasons of the attacks and to identify the threat and the 
vulnerability in order to mitigate it. As it was found that the user 
input is a major problem of the injection, filtering is one of the 
suggested solutions.  
Filtering is a technique to validate the user input from any 
unexpected input to be posted to the system. Our filtering 
method is to try to reject any punctuation marks and any reserved 
words in SPARQL query language that are not expected as an 
input to our system. We have provided a filtering algorithm to 
be applied by using any languages to filter the user input from 
SPARQL injection attack (Algorithm 1). 
After applying the filter algorithm by using PHP, the 
HCSWS has been tested against SPARQL injections attacks 
again to check the HCSWS's defence. Consequently, the 
injection has failed and the defence has succeeded.  
The mechanism of the filtering method is to validate any 
input from having any illegal content for a particular input. Thus, 
each input has a different purpose and different content 
expectation and the developers should be aware of this issue to 
apply the algorithm correctly.  
    
  FUNCTION FILTER (UserInput) 
    DEFINE ARRAY of SPARQL reserved words and 
    all possible 
    Punctuation marks that we do not expect from 
    the user     
    FOR i UPTO ArrayLength 
      COMPARE UserInput with  
      ARRAY[i] 
      If COMPARE RETURN Equal THEN 
        RETURN TRUE 
 END         
    END 
    RETURN FALSE 
  END FUNCTION 
   ALGORITHM 1: FILTERING THE USER INPUT FROM SPARQL INJECTIONS ATTACKS 
 
With different situations of each input, there is a probability 
that the user input might require to have SPARQL code. In this 
situation, the developer has to ensure that the sub query code 
does not have the same PHP variable. The reason is that if the 
content has the same variable, the whole result would change 
since the inner variable will discard the outer one by its new 
contents. Additionally, even if the input would have SPARQL 
content, the last character of the content should not be a hash 
sign.  
Figure 8. The presentation for how the SPARQL injection change the path of 
the target goal to malicious goal using input 1 
D. Client side vs. Web Server side vs. Data Server side 
As SW systems have several components, it is worth to think 
about in which component the protection against injection 
attacks should be implemented. Here is a typical scenario: the 
end user who acts as an attacker deals directly with the client 
side that is published by a web server. The web server has 
contact with the data store server to retrieve the required 
information. The concept of the SW is that the data is stored on 
a different server and not on the same server of the entire system 
as before. The question here is which side has to mitigate the 
vulnerability. 
Between the vulnerability and the risk, see Fig. 8, the threat 
of the injection code should be prevented. The vulnerability is a 
user input, and the user input is captured via HTML. PHP is the 
programming language used to act as an intermediary between 
the RDF data on the Sesame server or on the Jena Fuseki server 
and the end user. The risk as it was found occurs on the data 
server side where the RDF and the ontologies are located.  
The client side, which is the layout of the system that is 
implemented in HTML and CSS, can have a technique for 
validating the user input by using JavaScript language. This can 
prevent any undesired inputs from being posted to the web server 
where a PHP script processes the content. Having said that, the 
user might turn off the JavaScript, Thus, the validation will not 
work and the prevention will fail. 
The WAMP server is where all webpages implemented in 
PHP are located. If user input validation is done here, it can 
achieve the security purpose by mitigating the weak point by 
filtering the contents of that user input, as it was proposed before. 
In addition, using standard code writing will help to suspend the 
penetration since one of the reasons of the attack is the format of 
the code that was on the same line. Moreover, if it is possible to 
use parametrized string, then it should be used to deal with the 
query/update code, regardless if it is still not offered in PHP. 
In the data store server side, we can secure any sensitive 
ontologies using hash functions to be protected ontologies.  
To summarize our discussion, there are different ways to 
prevent injection attacks. These ways may protect against and 
prevent security breaches. Suggested solutions include: 
- Provide a SPARQL ParametrizedString tool for PHP 
developers. 
- Validate the user input using Filtering algorithm. 
- Have a standard for code writing. 
Meanwhile, some helpful ways that contribute to attack 
prevention: 
- Assign permission and access control for each user in the 
system. 
- Protect sensitive ontologies by using hash functions. 
- Use unpredictable variables names. 
VIII. EVALUATION  
A. Semantic Web and PHP 
This work has found that there are not many tools to be used 
by PHP to facilitate communicating with linked data. A sparqllib 
library [17] has been chosen randomly used for the first time to 
communicate with the RDF of the HCSWS on the Sesame and 
Jena server respectively. Then, it was discovered that the library 
does not work with the update function while we are trying to 
implement the Search and Delete screen in the HCSWS. The 
EasyRDF [16] is another library that has been chosen to facilitate 
the communication with the RDF data server and SPARQL 
engine for either querying or updating RDF data. Nevertheless, 
this library does not have any tools to support PHP for mitigating 
the vulnerability of SPARQL/SPARUL injection attacks. 
Despite simple and basic capabilities that can be used to 
develop a secure SW application in PHP, the awareness of 
filtering user's inputs can satisfy the security aims. 
On the other hand, it was found that Jena API (the library 
that facilitate the communication between Java and data store 
server) has provided the ParametrizedString tool to support the 
java developers to build secure SW application using Java. Thus, 
there is more facilitation for Java despite the popularity of PHP 
which might discourage PHP developers to move towards SW. 
However, our recommendations might guide the PHP 
developers toward implementing secure SW applications.   
B. ParametrizedString and Filter method 
The filter method has been successfully used to prevent the 
injection attack. To use it, the developer has to create an array of 
all unexpected input and then to compare all array elements with 
all elements on a particular user input. This way proved to be 
effective against the SPARQL injection in our experiment. 
Nevertheless, the developer might find this way tedious and time 
consuming since each input has to have different contents of 
array to check that input. Thinking of having one hundred inputs 
for example, the developer should check each of them against 
different arrays. Additionally, the developer might feel lazy and 
might neglect to prepare an array for each input. He/She might 
think that the reason of the attack is just the comment sign and 
he/she just has to check the input for having this sign. However, 
it is possible in some situation, as in SPARUL injection, that the 
attack succeeded without using a hash sign with a certain format 
(code 10). Although, the filter is a successful way for preventing 
injection attack, providing a ParametrizedString tool is highly 
recommended and encouraged; this supports the 
recommendation from [4].  
The SPARQL ParametrizedString tool works similar to the 
prepared statement against SQL injection that has proved its 
ability to prevent the attack [6]. The ParametrizedString would 
be easier and efficient. The developer has just to use this function 
to prepare efficiently the query and then connect it with the input 
variable. So, it deals with the query and the input separately. 
Closely related for instance, in the airport checkpoint, the 
security guard can check the content of the luggage manually. 
The problem with this is that the security guard might omit or 
miss something without notice; this is similar to filter method. 
On the other hand, the security guard can use some tools to check 
the luggage contents automatically as we can see at the airport 
checkpoint. The automatic method is more efficient and easier 
and this is like ParametrizedString tool. 
Our argument here is not to say that filter algorithm would 
not succeed, but to prove that there is a better solution but it is 
not provided yet. On the other hand, despite the advantages of 
ParametrizedString, the filter method can be used to validate 
user input and protect against any injection attacks, whether it is 
SQL, SPARQL or any other. 
Moreover, the ParametrizedString will be used with SPARQL 
code. On the other hand, the prepared statement is used with 
SQL code. The point here is different functions should be used 
with different types of query languages to be protected from the 
injections, with nearly the same concept, and this lead to 
question that how we can unite these function to be one for 
protecting any injections. This question has to be studied in 
future works. 
C. Vulnerability vs. Responsibility 
From the experiments, it was found that the user input can be 
a SPARQL injection attack threat if it is not validated which 
support the result of [3][4]. There is no doubt that in every 
system even on Web 1.0, Web 2.0 or the new generation, the 
user input would be vulnerable without validation.  
Nevertheless, the security risk is different, since the type of 
the asset and storing the asset is different. From a security point 
of view, protecting valuable things is critical regardless of how 
they are stored. However, these valuable things might be 
different and they should have different security approaches. 
Meanwhile, when the risk would lead to a true disaster in the 
information security, there will no place for negligence from the 
security guard, and that is why the risk assessment has been 
included. The SW is a world of linked data, and towards linked 
data, weaknesses gates should be securely closed toward a 
securely linked world.  
On the contrary, it was found from the experiment that the 
first responsible for the attack is the developer, since the one 
reason of the attack is the format of the actual code that received 
the injection as it was seen in results section.  
Vulnerability is a responsibility. Responsibility for whoever 
acts as a developer, security agent, researcher or an ontologist. 
Responsibility for what?  Responsibility for writing the code 
efficiently while paying attention to security aspects, and not to 
simplify the injection. Responsibility for standardising the code 
writing. Responsibility for choosing unpredictable variables 
names. Responsibility for encrypting sensitive ontologies. 
Responsibility for validating any user input and responsibility 
for providing tools to mitigate the vulnerability. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Several studies have started to evaluate the security of the 
SW. This research continued to study some vulnerabilities on its 
applications. These vulnerabilities pose security concerns and 
might allow SPARQL, Blind SPARQL and SPARUL injection 
attacks to break the security framework of SW applications. 
The research approach was to apply the attack on a sample 
of SW application that is developed by PHP, taking health care 
as an example and calling the system HCSWS. The attacks 
experiments have proved that the system is vulnerable to the 
SPARQL/SPARUL injections attacks if the user input is not 
validated or mitigated. In addition, the simple capabilities of 
using PHP to implement a SW application. 
The experiments showed the high security impact on the CIA 
of the HCSWS. The problem of the attack has been analysed in 
order to identify risk analysis towards risk mitigation. As a 
result, the research assumption has been confirmed. 
Several solutions have been proposed with some arguments 
for the best one in addition to Filter algorithm that was provided.  
The research has highlighted that vulnerability mitigation is 
a responsibility of the developer and there is no place for 
complaisance. The world now is built on information and linked 
data, so, weaknesses should be patched. Meanwhile, PHP is a 
popular language for web application development and to cope 
with the new generation of technologies. PHP should have 
support for developing secure code to communicate with RDF 
data stores and retrieving or modifying linked data. 
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